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THE EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN – BACKGROUND
The European Ombudsman (EO) as established by the Treaty of Maastricht 
is entrusted with the objective of combatting mal-administration by the 
executive branch of the European Union (EU).1 The EO’s mandate and 
powers are Union-specific but were developed against the development of 
ombuds-review in various jurisdictions since the early 19th century.
The European concept of an ombudsman was first developed in Sweden. 
Swedish constitutional legislation of 18092 created an  ombudsman as rep-
resentative of citizens’ interests, who, in the absence of direct remedies 
against the Swedish crown, was authorized to take cases against public 
authorities to court on behalf of individuals.3 In the twentieth century the 
idea of an independent ombudsman spread to many other jurisdictions. 
The concept of ombudsreivew has since been adapted to a variety of 
different situations, such as public bodies adjudicating conflicts between 
individuals and certain sectors of public-interest industries, like  insurance, 
or between minorities and the central government.4 But today’s EO is 
1 The EO now has its legal basis in Article 228 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU).
2 The års regeringsform of 1809. See further: Hans Gammelthoft-Hansen, ‘The 
Establishment of the European Ombudsman’, in European Ombudsman (ed.), 
The European Ombudsman, Origins, Establishment, Evolution, Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities (Luxembourg: 2005) 13–26 at p. 14.
3 Address of Jacob Söderman given to the conference organized at the occa-
sion of the 20th anniversary of the Ombudsman Office in Brussels, 22 June 2015.
4 See for many such institutions the Finnish Ombudsman for Minorities (an 
institution established in 2001 by The Finnish Anti-Discrimination Act, www.
ofm.fi); the Belgian Insurance Ombudsman (‘Ombudsman pour les services des 
assurances Belge’ set up under Article 302 of the Loi relative aux assurances of 4 
April 2014, Moniteur Belge of 30 April 2014 or the Canadian Public Procurement 
Ombudsman (http://opo-boa.gc.ca/lrpa-rarp-eng.html).
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probably most closely modelled on the Danish ombudsman. In Denmark, 
the office of the public ombudsman was established in the second half 
of the twentieth century as a body mainly empowered to fight against 
maladministration in the public sector and searching together with the 
 administration to setting things right and settle the reason for complaint 
from the complainant’s point of view. The key characteristic is thus a 
‘problem-solving function’ with the objective of finding amicable  solutions 
to problems between the administration and the citizenry.5
Already in the 1970s, proposals for the establishment of a European 
ombudsman were made.6 These were taken up in the run-up to the 
Treaty of Maastricht by the Spanish government, who made the first 
attempt to introduce a ‘European Ombudsman’. as an accessible body 
helping to  overcome the perceived distance and potential alienation felt 
by EU  citizens from the complex administrative procedures needed for 
 implementation of EU law.7 This ombudsperson would be in charge 
of reviewing all  implementing activities of EU law by both EU bodies 
and institutions as well as Member States.8 When it appeared that the 
Spanish version was too broad for some Member States, the Danish 
 government then proposed limiting the ombudsman’s powers to review 
of EU  institutions only. This was the proposition which gained majority 
support and subsequently entered into force with the Treaty of Maastricht.
Not by conincidence, the creation of the EO took place simultane-
ously with the creation of the concept of Union citizenship in the Treaty 
of Maastricht. In fact, the right to turn to the EO with a complaint 
about an instance of maladministration is quite explicitly linked to 
5 Address of Jacob Söderman given to the conference organized at the occa-
sion of the 20th anniversary of the Ombudsman Office in Brussels, 22 June 2015.
6 For the history of the idea of establishing a European Ombudsman and 
a general overview over the office, see, e.g., Saverio Baviera, ‘Les pétitions 
au Parlement européen et le Médiateur européen’, RMC 445 (2001) 129–36; 
Simone Cadeddu, ‘The proceedings of the European Ombudsman’, L & Contemp. 
Probs. 68 (2004) 161–80; Jacob Söderman, ‘A thousand and one complaints: the 
European Ombudsman en route’, EPL 3 (1997) 351–61; Alexandros Tsadiras, 
‘The Ombudsman’, in Paul Craig (ed.), European Administrative Law (Oxford 
University Press 2006) 829–32.
7 Anne Peters, ‘The European Ombudsman and the European Constitution’, 
CMLRev. 42 (2005) 697–743 at 699–700.
8 Carlos Moreiro González, ‘The Spanish Proposal to the Intergovernmental 
Conference on Political Union’, in The European Ombudsman (ed.), The European 
Ombudsman, Origins, Establishment, Evolution, Office for Official Publications 
of the European Communities (Luxembourg: 2005) 27–37; speech by Jacob 
Söderman given to the conference organized at the occasion of the 20th anniver-
sary of the Ombudsman Office in Brussels, 22 June 2015.
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the concept of EU citizenship, in such rules as Articles 20(2)(d) and 24 
(third paragraph) TFEU, pursuant to which ‘[e]very citizen of the Union 
may apply to the Ombudsman established in accordance with Article 
228’ TFEU. This is also explicitly protected as a fundamental right in 
Article 43 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(‘Charter’), which gives citizens and persons residing in the Member 
States the right to refer to the ‘Ombudsman cases of maladministration 
in the activities of the  institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the 
Union’.
The Approach Taken by the First Three Holders of the Office of the 
European Ombudsman
For the first twenty years of its existence, three individuals have held the 
role of the EO and each has interpreted the role’s mandate a bit differently. 
The approach taken by the individual office holder, particularly in such a 
personalized body as the EO, can be – and has been – quite decisive.
The first holder of the office was the former Finish Ombudsman, 
Jacob Söderman. He approached the office’s mandate to review EU 
 administration activities by first finding that the EO should deal with 
the concerns expressed by citizens about the Commission’s role as the 
‘Guardian of the Treaty’. However, he also interpreted the mandate 
of the EO broadly to include also the growing number of European 
 agencies. This approach was officially vindicated with entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 228 TFEU now explicitly recognises the 
EO’s mandate to supervise actions of institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union. An explicit exception exists only for the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) when acting in its judicial 
capacity.9
Söderman’s approach was further to indirectly include Member 
State activity by requiring the Commission to provide information to 
 individual complainants about a Member State’s violation of EU law. 
One of Söderman’s central contributions was ensuring that the  institutions 
respected their obligations through a careful-but-forceful review of 
 complaints. By mostly handling individuals’ complaints, he embodied 
the EU-legitimizing role of the defender of citizens’ rights and interests 
in the good administration of the Union. In this context, he defined 
9 Article 228(1) TFEU and Nikiforos Diamandouros, ‘The European 
Ombudsman and the Application of EU Law by the Member States’, Review of 
European Administrative Law 2 (2008) 5–37 at p. 7.
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maladministration through a soft-law guidance document entitled ‘The 
European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour’.10 Despite efforts to 
convince the institutions to adopt the soft-law code as a binding act of 
the Union, no EU administrative procedure act has entered into force. 
Nevertheless, EO Söderman successfully lobbied for the inclusion of 
Article 41, entitled ‘Right to Good Administration’, in the Charter. On yet 
another front, in order to overcome the shortcomings of a mandate limited 
to just the institutions and bodies of the Union, EO Söderman initiated 
a network of ombudsmen, including national ombudsmen and similar 
bodies  throughout the Member States, which was designed to address 
complaints about implementation of EU law by Member State bodies.
The second EO, the former Greek ombudsman, Nikiforos 
Diamandouros, placed particular emphasis on the fact that the 
 maladministration the EO should be expected to address is a far-wider 
and more encompassing concept than just illegal activity on the part 
of EU institutions and bodies. Rather, he added to the EO’s already 
accepted role as defender of citizens’ rights and interests the additional 
role of ‘enhancer’ of the Union’s integrity, which required all ombuds-
review to also focus on the manner and effect of EU administrative 
activity.11
Twenty years after the Treaty of Maastricht entered into force, the 
European Parliament (hereafter, the ‘Parliament’) elected a third person 
to hold the EO office, Emily O’Reilly, a former ombudsman of Ireland. 
She has taken what she describes as a more ‘political’ approach to her 
role; according to her, the EO’s mission should be understood as reaching 
well beyond a simple adjudicatory role since ‘a narrow description of this 
institution as a complaint handling [sic] body fails . . . to give adequate 
expression to its deeper role as an embedder of democracy, as a driver of 
change in a culture that still lacks the requisite levels of accountability and 
transparency appropriate to institutions crafted from the finest European 
ideals’.12
This politicization of the role of EO is an attempt to ensure more 
public visibility for the EO. Ombudsman O’Reilly seeks to use her 
office’s resolution of individual complaints not only as a  problem-solving 
tool for the individual complainants, but also as a ‘driver of change’ 
10 See www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/resources/code.faces#/page/1, accessed 
4 January 2017.
11 See with further explanations Nikiforos Diamandouros, Chapter 9 in this 
book.
12 Speech by Ombudsman Emily O’Reilly at the Conference at the occasion of 
the 20 years of the European Ombudsman, 22 June 2015, Brussels.
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and a ‘vehicle’ by which to ‘tackle wider systemic problems’ within the 
EU.13
Challenges Arising from Defining the Future Role of the European 
Ombudsman
The ambitious tasks formulated by O’Reilly raises the question of whether 
the EO’s Treaty mandate allows the EO to act as a ‘driver of change’ and 
to take the initiative to actively tackle some of the EU’s ‘wider systemic 
problems’ as autonomously identified by the EO.14 Is such politicization 
of the role of the EO and of the instrument of ombuds-review  compatible 
with the Treaty’s design and, if so, to what extent? How should the 
balance be struck between, on one hand, a reactive approach based 
on  investigations of individual complaints, and, on the other, a more 
 proactive approach based on own-initiative investigations? This chapter 
looks at these  questions, first, by analysing the legal framework of EO 
activities, second, a look at the current nature of ombuds-review in the EU 
and, third, by an analysis of the accountability mechanism the EO faces 
in an attempt to answer the time-honoured question: ‘quis custodiet ipsos 
custodes’.15
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK: THE OMBUDSMAN AS 
AN INDEPENDENT SUPERVISORY BODY OF THE 
PARLIAMENT
The role and possibilities of ombuds-review are defined by the  constitutional 
mandate in the Treaty provisions. These influence the notions of the EO’s 
independence and investigatory powers and the concept of maladminis-
tration and the consequences of finding it. Although interrelated, these 
elements will be addressed separately in the following pages.
13 Speech by Ombudsman Emily O’Reilly given to the conference organized 
at the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Ombudsman Office in Brussels, 22 
June 2015.
14 Speech by Ombudsman Emily O’Reilly given to the conference organized 
at the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Ombudsman Office in Brussels, 22 
June 2015.
15 D. IVNI IVVENALIS SATVRA VI, at www.thelatinlibrary.com/juvenal/6.
shtml, accessed 4 January 2017, line 347.
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Independence and Relation to the Parliament
The EO is a position designed to both require and protect the  independence 
of the office holder. The nature, extent and potential of this independence 
define the areas in which development of the EO’s activities is possible, 
that is to say, the potential to develop specific approaches to the office. 
To look for such independence, one must start with the office holder’s 
nomination and election. Each EO must be elected by the Parliament16 
‘after each election’ for the duration of that particular Parliament’s term 
of office, such that the terms of office for both the Parliament and the EO 
coincide. Thus, the appointment and reappointment of any particular 
individual to the office of EO is, to a certain degree, dependent on the 
political majorities in the electing Parliament.
Once elected by the Parliament, the elected individual must give his or 
her solemn oath, before the CJEU, to maintain his or her  independence 
and impartiality throughout his or her term of office. Impartiality is 
a key term; the law requires the EO to ‘be completely independent in 
the  performance of his [or her] duties’ and to ‘neither seek nor take 
 instructions from any government, institution, body, office or entity’ 
in the performance of his or her duties.17 Consequently, to ensure the 
EO independence, he or she can only be dismissed by the CJEU at the 
request of the Parliament. Nevertheless, if an incumbent would like to be 
 re-elected for an additional mandate, he or she might well keep an eye on 
the likely majorities in the next Parliament.
Post-election, the formal relationship between the EO and the Parliament 
consists of the EO forwarding reports to the Parliament after receiving the 
investigated body’s or institution’s response to his or her initial finding of 
maladministration, and presenting an annual report to the Parliament on 
the outcomes of his or her enquiries.18 These reports allow the Parliament, 
which is formally in charge of supervising the executive branch of the EU, 
to stay informed about maladministration and use those certain limited 
powers it has to force a recalcitrant administration to rectify a problem 
identified by the EO.
The Parliament also has a particularly strong role in designing the 
16 Article 228(1) TFEU.
17 Article 228 (3) TFEU and Articles 6(2) and 9 of the Decision of the European 
Parliament on the regulations and general conditions governing the performance 
of the Ombudsman’s duties, originally of 9 March 1994; (OJ 1994 L 113/15, as 
amended by Decisions of 14 March 2002 (deleting Articles 12 and 16) (OJ 2002 L 
92/13) and 18 June 2008 (OJ 2008 L 189/25)) (hereafter, the ‘Ombudsman Statute’).
18 Article 228(1) TFEU.
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role and powers of the EO: Article 228(4) TFEU gives it the power to 
enact regulations and general conditions governing performance of the 
EO’s duties, commonly referred to as the EO’s ‘Statute’.19 The procedure 
applicable to this power is unique, in that it is one of the rare occasions in 
which the Parliament has been given the authority to legislate on its own 
initiative ‘after seeking an opinion from the Commission and with the 
approval of the Council’.20
Reactions to Complaints and Own-Initiative Investigations – the 
Ombudsman as ‘Inspector of the Executive’
The independence of the EO from executive bodies (and its link to 
the Parliament) is designed to permit his or her impartiality when 
addressing complaints about executive maladministration. Reflecting that 
 independence, the EO is entitled to initiate an investigation either upon 
receipt of a complaint or on his or her own initiative.
For the former, the EO exercises his or her duties by seeking  solutions 
to disputes between citizens, on the one hand, and EU institutions, bodies, 
offices, and agencies, on the other. Harden finds that ‘[a]lthough the 
focus is on the question of whether there is maladministration or not, 
the EO works in dispute-resolution mode, associated with the search for 
 consensual solutions’.21
Therefore, ombuds-review contains both a review function and a redress 
function. This allows the EO to act, in many instances, as a  cost-effective 
alternative to judicial redress.22 In other instances, a complaint to the 
EO could be the only possible redress for an individual (e.g., where 
19 The Parliament exercised that power, adopting the Ombudsman Statute.
20 The legislation in force at the time this chapter was written pre-dated the 
Treaty of Lisbon and was adopted in the form of the Ombudsman Statute with its 
implementing provisions (Decision of the European Ombudsman adopting imple-
menting provisions, 8 July 2002 as amended by decision of the Ombudsman of 5 
April 2004 (hereafter, the ‘Implementing Provisions’)). The European Parliament 
is the seat of the Ombudsman (Article 13 Ombudsman Statute) which is also the 
seat of the Ombudsman Secretariat (Article 11 Ombudsman Statute).
21 Ian Harden, ‘Article 43 Ombudsman’, in S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner 
and A. Ward (eds.) The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Hart 2014) 1121–50 
at 1128; see also N. Diamandouros, ‘The Relationship between the Principle of 
Good Administration and Legal Obligations’, in C. Baudenbacher, C. Gulman, 
K. Lenaerts, E. Coulon, E. Barbier (eds.) Liber Amicorum Bo Vesterdorf (Bruylant 
2007) 315–41.
22 Milan Remác, Coordinating Ombudsmen and the Judiciary (Intersentia 2014) 
234–5.
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 procedural errors are challenged that result in non-binding acts which are 
not subject to judicial review under Article 263 TFEU). More generally, 
ombuds-review is always subordinate to judicial review, because the EO 
has no power to investigate facts that ‘are or have been the subject of legal 
 proceedings’ at the level of either the Union or the Member States.23
The Treaty of Lisbon introduced, in the first paragraph of Article 
228(1) TFEU, a formal obligation on the part of the EO to examine 
complaints by individuals. After first empowering the EO to receive 
complaints concerning maladministration, the paragraph goes on to say 
that ‘[h]e or she shall examine such complaints and report on them’. This 
last sentence leaves the EO no discretion as to whether or not to report 
on a complaint. Nevertheless, notwithstanding this obligation to assess 
a complaint, a complaint to the EO must still be admissible; the rules on 
the admissibility of such a complaint are outlined in the Statute, which 
provides, in relevant part, ‘a complaint shall be made within two years of 
the date on which the facts on which it is based came to the attention of the 
person lodging the complaint’.24 The assistance of the EO is subordinate 
to seeking ‘the appropriate administrative approaches to the institutions 
and bodies concerned’.25 Moreover, the EO may not receive complaints 
that concern ‘work relationships between the Community institutions and 
bodies and their officials and other servants unless all the possibilities for 
the submission of internal administrative requests and complaints, have 
been exhausted’.26
The right to make a complaint rests with any citizen of the Union or any 
natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member 
State.27 To date, the EO has so far interpreted the Treaty’s pre-conditions 
for access broadly: a complaint is only rejected as inadmissible if the 
 complainant is not an EU citizen, is not physically present in the EU, or 
is not registered as a legal person in the EU. Questions regarding a legal 
person’s place of registration or the existence of legal personality have 
been widely interpreted to include both private and public entities active 
in the Union. Moreover, even if a particular complainant cannot meet the 
strict requirements of the TFEU, the EO may, in its discretion, undertake 
its own investigation pursuant to Article 228(1) TFEU, as implemented 
23 Article 228(2) TFEU.
24 Article 228(1) TFEU.
25 See Article 2(4) Ombusdman Statute. Moreover, complaints submitted to 
the Ombudsman do not affect time limits for appeals in administrative or judicial 
proceedings.
26 See Article 2(6) and (8) Ombudsman Statute.
27 Article 228(1) TFEU; see also Article 43 Charter, which uses the same terms.
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by Article 3(1) of the Statute,28 which permits the EO to review adminis-
trative activity for which an admissible complaint has not yet been, and 
may never be, submitted, and which may, or may not, involve European 
citizens. The EO’s power to investigate without having received an admis-
sible  complaint29 means that the institutional scope of ombuds-review 
is very broad. That fact may well explain the current disconnect in the 
general public’s  perception of the EO; people do not connect the EO with 
European  citizenship – that is to say, they have decoupled the two concepts.
Second, the EO’s task is to provide supervisory oversight over the 
 administration in general, in order to enhance its accountability and 
to help to improve its quality, and is thus not restricted to  responding 
to  complaints but can act on its own initiative.30 Harlow and Rawlings 
qualify the powers granted in Article 2 of the EO Statute to enter 
into own-initiative investigations as ‘something of the quality of a 
 “government  inspector”, standing halfway in-between administration 
and adjudication’.31 The EO’s own-initiative investigations are not only 
valuable in situations where there is a public interest in clarifying and 
 improving a situation, but also in cases where individuals are unlikely to be 
in a position to launch a complaint.32 His or her initiatives are a powerful 
tool, especially in cases where many complaints point to a more systemic 
problem, or in cases where individuals will generally not have the means or 
the know-how to complain, for example in the policy areas of immigration 
and asylum. The use of own-initiative investigations to overcome these 
specific problems, endemic in the EU system of executive governance and 
its multilevel administrative cooperation, appears sensible, particularly in 
view of the lack of other types of review available under EU law.
An own-initiative inquiry may also be launched by the EO on the 
basis of information provided by a so-called whistle-blower. Article 
28 For an overview of the decision-making practice of the Ombudsman’s office 
with further references, see Alexandros Tsadiras, ‘The Ombudsman’, in Paul Craig 
(ed.), European Administrative Law (Oxford University Press 2006) 833–88.
29 For example, the Ombudsman may decide to start his or her own investiga-
tion after having received an inadmissible complaint or having obtained informa-
tion alleging maladministration in a form that did not qualify as a complaint.
30 Anne Peters, ‘The European Ombudsman and the European Constitution’, 
CMLRev. 42 (2005) 697–743 at 711–12.
31 Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Process and Procedure in EU 
Administration (Bloomsbury Publishing 2014) 7.
32 One such example is the Ombudsman’s own-initiative enquiry OI/9/2014/
MHZ regarding types of maladministration in the context of how FRONTEX 
ensures, in combination with national authorities, that joint return operations are 
conducted with full respect for the fundamental rights of individuals.
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22a of the EU Staff Regulation,33 for example, states that officials need 
to report possible cases of fraud, corruption, other illegal activity, or 
professional conduct that constitutes a serious failure to comply with 
obligations, and Article 22b permits, under certain conditions, those 
officials to provide that information to the EO.34 Even before the 
Treaty of Lisbon introduced a broader definition of EU administration 
than the one contained in the Treaty of Maastricht, the EO undertook 
enquiries not only into the EU institutions, but also into all ‘bodies 
established by the Treaties. This includes the Economic and Social 
Committee and the European Central Bank, as well as bodies set up by 
legislation under the Treaties, including agencies such as the European 
Environment Agency and the European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Co-operation at the External Borders (FRONTEX).’35 
The EO’s oversight responsibility also extends to entities that have been 
established jointly by the EU and one or more Member States with the 
aim of furthering the Union’s interest (e.g., the European University 
Institute in Florence).36
Investigative Powers of the Ombudsman
When investigating a complaint, the EO Statute grants the EO special 
powers; he or she enjoys access to information and documents held by 
European and national administrations and may require the institutions 
to supply any documents within a reasonable time, conduct on-the-spot 
investigations, and take copies of any relevant documents found.37 Union 
33 Regulation No. 1023/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 22 October 2013 amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European 
Union and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European 
Union, OJ 2013 L 287/15-62 (hereafter the ‘EU Staff Regulation’). Any such 
information must be provided in writing and directed to either the individual’s 
superior, his Director-General, the Secretary General of the institution (or persons 
in equivalent positions), or the OLAF (Article 22a EU Staff Regulation).
34 Article 22b of the EU Staff Regulation further provides that, after a certain 
interval has passed, the official may also provide the relevant information to, inter 
alia, the Ombudsman. In practice, the Ombudsman either treats the receipt of such 
information as a complaint or opens an own-initiative investigation on the basis 
of that information. For a more expansive discussion, see Ian Harden, ‘Article 
43 Ombudsman’, in S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner and A. Ward (eds.) The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (Hart 2014) 1121–50 at 1139. 
35 European Ombudsman, Annual Report 2006, 36.
36 For example, Decision of the European Ombudsman on Complaint 
659/2000/GG of 24 November 2000.
37 Article 3 Ombudsman Statute.
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institutions and bodies are obliged to supply the EO with any  information 
he or she requests, and to provide access to files (subject to certain 
 exceptions for classified or sensitive documents).38 At the EO’s request, 
documents originating in a Member State are also to be provided after 
having informed the Member State concerned. Moreover, the EO has the 
power to compel Union officials and servants to testify as part of his or 
her investigation.
Recourse to the EO is also authorized for failure to publish information 
that must be published.39 The Public Access Regulation is binding on the 
Member States, except where national laws on secrecy or other matters 
prevent disclosure, and the required information is to be provided via 
the Member State’s permanent representation.40 Where such information 
is not given as required, the EO is to inform the Parliament, which can 
then intervene itself. In addition, the EO may commission studies and 
hear testimony from experts external to the institutions and bodies.41 
These investigatory powers, when twinned with the EO’s own-initiative 
investigatory power, make for a particularly powerful combination. 
Any politically minded EO can use these tools beyond simple reaction to 
 complaints. Temptation might be strong to act as a supervisory agency of 
its own making.
The Concept of Maladministration
EO activity can, according to Article 228 TFEU,42 be undertaken 
 ‘concerning instances of maladministration in the activities of the Union 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies’.43 The EO has the functions of 
uncovering examples of ‘maladministration’ and ‘mak[ing] recommenda-
tions to put an end to it’. The only other mention of ‘maladministration’ in 
the Treaties is in the first paragraph of Article 226 TFEU, which  authorizes 
the Parliament to establish, without prejudice to the powers of other 
38 Article 3(2) Ombudsman Statute.
39 Article 8 Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, 
Council and Commission documents (hereinafter, the ‘Public Access Regulation’).
40 Article 3(3) Ombudsman Statute.
41 Article 3(2) Ombudsman Statute and Article 5(1), (2), and (4) Implementing 
Provisions. (www.ombudsman.europa.eu/lbasis/en/provis.htm, accessed 19 
February 2010).
42 See also Article 43 Charter.
43 Importantly, both Article 228 TFEU and Article 43 Charter make an excep-
tion relating to ‘the Court of Justice of the European Union acting in its judicial 
role’.
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 institutions or bodies, temporary Committees of Inquiry to  investigate 
contravention or maladministration of Union law. Such Committees of 
Inquiry also have far reaching investigatory powers.
The concept of maladministration, although mentioned in Treaty 
 provisions, is not defined therein. It is however, decisive to identify the 
EO’s mandate. It is decisive for identifying the types of misconduct the EO 
may investigate to which the EO may offer suggestions for improvement; 
thus determining the term’s breadth and scope is an important undertak-
ing. According to the first EO, Jacob Söderman, the essential quality of 
maladministration was defined in a legal manner aligned with the Finnish 
and wider-Nordic traditions of ombuds-review. During his tenure, at least, 
maladministration was said to occur whenever an EU authority, when 
acting in their administrative capacity, ‘fail[ed] to act in accordance with 
the Treaties’ or with European law in general. EO Söderman believed that 
maladministration could equally arise out of the case law of the European 
courts, including the so-called General Principles of EU law expressed by 
the CJEU and implemented throughout the Union by national courts.44
Today, however, the EO generally looks at two main criteria to 
determine if an act qualifies as maladministration. The first criteria is 
the  institution’s or body’s compliance with the rule of law: does the act 
in question respect all procedural and substantive rights of individuals 
including, without limitation, the individual’s fundamental rights?45 In 
other words, the EO asks if the act or decision is legal. But, the EO’s review 
in relation to this criteria does not extend to a review of the result of an 
exercise of discretionary authority undertaken within the limits of that 
institution’s or body’s specific legal authority: the EO can review the act 
or decision’s legality but not the discretionary policy choices made by the 
administrative actors.46
Nonetheless, as Joana Mendes (Chapter 6 in this book) discusses, the 
broad nature of  the EO’s mandate should not, in principle, distinguish 
between instances of  review where the administration enjoyed discre-
44 European Ombudsman, Annual Report 1997, 2.2.1. See also Peter Gjerloeff 
Bonnor, ‘The European Ombudsman: a novel source of soft law in the European 
Union’, ELRev. 25 (2000) 39–56 at 42–3. Jon Marcus Meese, Das Petitionsrecht 
beim Europäischen Parlament und das Beschwerderecht beim Bürgerbeauftragten 
der Europäischen Union (Lang 2000) 190.
45 See the definition of maladministration given in European Ombudsman, 
Annual Report 1997, 17 and 23 respectively. See generally also Paul Magnette, 
‘Entre contrôle parlementaire et “état de droit”: le rôle politique du médiateur 
dans l’Union européenne’, Revue Français ScPol 51 (2001) 933–48.
46 So this covers cases of what might be referred to as Rechtsaufsicht and not 
Fachaufsicht.
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tionary powers or not.47 Maladministration can occur in all exercise 
of  public powers. In this view, illegality implies maladministration but 
is not limited to it. Focusing solely on illegality would not sufficiently 
distinguish the EO from an (administrative) court48 which might be 
regarded in violation of  the effet utile of  the Treaty provisions on the 
EO. Maladministration as a critiera takes into account the legality but 
not the expediency of  a decision – a formal limitation of  ombuds-review 
that should be taken into account, especially when the EO reviews dis-
cretionary decisions.
The second criteria the EO applies to determine if  maladministration 
exists derives from a reflection on the very purpose of public  administration: 
to perform administrative duties for the benefit of citizens and to enable 
citizens to exercise their rights.49 For example, Article 12 of the Code of 
Good Administrative Behaviour expressly contemplates courtesy and 
responsiveness by EU officials towards individuals:
The official shall be service-minded, correct, courteous and accessible in 
relations with the public. When answering correspondence, telephone calls 
and e-mails, the official shall try to be as helpful as possible and shall reply 
as completely and accurately as possible to questions which are asked. If the 
official is not responsible for the matter concerned, he shall direct the citizen 
to the appropriate official. If an error occurs which negatively affects the 
rights or interests of a member of the public, the official shall apologise for it 
and endeavour to correct the negative effects resulting from his or her error in 
the most expedient way and inform the member of the public of any rights of 
appeal in accordance with Article 19 of the Code.50 
47 See Joana Mendes, Chapter 6 in this book. See also Gregorio Garzón 
Clariana, ‘Holding the Administration Accountable in Respect of its Discretionary 
Powers’, in The European Ombudsman (ed.), The European Ombudsman, Origins, 
Establishment, Evolution, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities (Luxembourg: 2005) 191–209.
48 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Damien Chalmers, Christos 
Hadjiemmanuil, Giorgo Monto, and Adam Tomkins, European Union Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2006) 338.
49 In the report of the first European Ombudsman, Jacob Söderman, ‘The 
Citizen, the Administration and Community Law’ at the XVIII Congress of 
FIDE (Fédération internationale de droit européen), Stockholm, 3–6 June 1998 
(www.ombudsman.europa.eu/fide/en/default.htm, accessed 4 January 2017) this is 
described in the following terms: ‘At the level of national systems of administra-
tion, the principle is formulated and expressed in different ways including, for 
example: service-mindedness, citizen-friendliness, the citizen as “customer” and 
the concept of public service. The basic idea which underlies all these notions is 
that the administration exists to serve citizens, not vice versa.’
50 Article 12 of the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour.
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While failure to abide by these requirements does not rise to the level 
of illegality, it may certainly qualify as maladministration. Thus, it is a 
perfect example of how ‘illegality necessarily implies maladministration, 
maladministration does not automatically entail illegality’.51 Therefore, 
maladministration cannot automatically be viewed as merely the opposite 
of ‘good administration’ as narrowly identified in Article 41 Charter but 
recognized more broadly as a General Principle of EU law.52 Although the 
‘good’ vs. ‘bad’ juxtaposition sounds intuitively compelling, it does not, in 
fact, hold up across all language versions of the Treaty.53
The limits of the concept of maladministration are thus extremely impor-
tant in identifying the EO’s mandate. They arise, generally  speaking, from 
the distinction between the processes involving legislative and  judiciary 
functions, on one hand, and administrative action by the  executive branch, 
on the other. This limitation indicates that the EO does not have the right 
to intervene when a legislative act of the Union or a court judgement 
requires certain action from administrations. Action taken to comply with 
the law is not maladministration, even though it might be understood by 
the complaining party – and the EO – to be ‘wrongful’.54
Overall, the purpose behind the EO’s mandate appears to provide some 
potential recourse for those actions that, while in strict compliance with 
the law, still result in maladministration. As courts may only sanction 
actions taken outside the law, the EO’s role is more nuanced. It can look 
at the manner in which compliance occurred, and find that, while the 
51 Nikiforos Diamandouros, ‘The European Ombudsman and the application 
of EU Law by the Member States’, Review of European Administrative Law 2 
(2008) 5–37.
52 See Herwig C.H. Hofmann and Bucura Mihaescu, ‘The relation between 
the Charter’s fundamental rights and the unwritten general principles of EU law – 
good administration as the test-case’, European Constitutional Law Review 9 (2013) 
73–101.
53 Some language versions of Articles 226 and 228 TFEU, such as the 
English and French language versions, speak of ‘maladministration’ and ‘mauvaise 
administration’, as opposed to ‘good administration’ and ‘bonne administration’, 
respectively. However, in other language versions (e.g., the German version), 
this link is less compelling, with the wording in the TFEU referring with a more 
limited ‘Misstände bei der Anwendung [des Unionsrechts]’ (Article 226 TFEU) 
and ‘Misstände bei der Tätigkeit der Organe, Einrichtungen und sonstigen Stellen’ 
(Article 228 TFEU), which translate more to finding a ‘wrong’ or ‘deplorable’ 
state of affairs rather than the notion of good administration (gute Verwaltung) in 
Article 41 Charter.
54 See, with further examples, Ian Harden, ‘Article 43 Ombudsman’ in S. Peers, 
T. Hervey, J. Kenner and A. Ward (eds.) The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(Hart 2014) 1121–50 at 1133.
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result was legal, it still constituted maladministration and thus the EO’s 
mandate goes beyond what is sanctionable through judicial review.55 But, 
the fact that the EO can review illegality as an instance of maladministra-
tion implies that the EO has the power to interpret the law and to classify 
the action accordingly. This power exists independently of judicial review, 
which suggests that positions taken by the EO do not have to comply with 
those of other Union institutions. It is possible that activity categorized 
by the EO as illegal will not be seen as such by the CJEU, or the inverse.
Such power to interpret the law, obviously, does not change the fact 
that an EO recommendation is not binding. Accordingly, the aim of EO 
investigations can go beyond an ex post review of grievances. The EO can 
also draft special reports on specific concerns of maladministration and 
focus on specific issues in the EO’s annual reports to the Parliament. This 
ex post review is aimed towards proactively improving administrative 
procedures for the future, avoiding further instances of what the EO has 
classified as maladministration.56 Maladministration therefore can imply 
unlawful conduct by an EU institution or body but maladministration 
can also occur where no illegality is found.57 Due to the limitations of the 
EO’s mandate, illegality in implementation of EU law by Member State 
administrations can only be sanctioned by a national ombudsman, court, 
tribunal or equivalent.58
The nature of investigations into maladministration – with a view 
towards ensuring the integrity of executive action when implementing 
EU law – explains why the various holders of the position of the EO have 
 consistently developed their role in a strikingly similar approach to that 
of the manner in which the Court of Auditors expanded the concept of 
 auditing and, thereby, expanded its role as an oversight body. Both EU 
bodies see themselves as being tasked with a duty to maintain the  ‘integrity’ 
of administrative decision-making and implementation of EU procedures. 
55 See, e.g., T-294/03 Gibrault v Commission [2005] ECR II-635, para. 45 with 
clarifying reference to (Spanish language publication only); Joined Case T-219/02 
and T-337/02 Herrera v Commission [2004] ECR-SC II-1407, ECLI:EU:T:2004:318, 
para. 101; and European Ombudsman, Annual Report 2006, 35 with references to 
the judgments of the CFI of 28 October 2004 in Joined Cases T-219 and 337/02 
Herrera v Commission [2004] ECR-SC IA-319 and II-1407, para. 101, and of 4 
October 2006 in Case T-193/04 R Hans-Martin Tillack v Commission [2006] ECR 
II-3995, para. 128.
56 European Ombudsman, Annual Report 2004, 9.
57 Case T-193/04 Tillack v Commission [2006] ECR II-3995, paras. 116 and 128.
58 I.G. Dimitrakopoulos, ‘Is an illegal Community act necessarily an instance 
of maladministration, in the sense of Article 195 EC?’ Review of European 
Administrative Law (2009) 45–55.
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Both the Court of Auditors and the EO have adopted approaches that 
exercise a broad contextual – and, to a certain degree, political – review 
of EU administrative activity. For the Court of Auditors, it started with 
a more encompassing standard of review, moving away from a purely 
 financial audit towards a broader ‘performance’ audit. The current EO 
would also like to push for greater visibility and impact through high 
profile cases and more political activism, but the EO can only do so in the 
context of the EO’s authority to examine instances of maladministration.
Consequences of Findings of Maladministration
If, as a result of ombuds-review, the EO finds an instance of maladministra-
tion, a number of possible steps can be taken. The effects of a finding of mal-
administration to a certain degree has an influence on the degree of review 
which the EO can, and possibly should, undertake. Once the EO finds mal-
administration, the next steps to be taken, and ultimate consequences, are 
provided for in Article 228 TFEU, Article 3(6) of the EO Statute, and Article 
6 et seq. of the Implementing Provisions.59 Article 228(1) TFEU provides:
Where the Ombudsman establishes an instance of maladministration, he shall 
refer the matter to the institution, body, office or agency concerned, which 
shall have a period of three months in which to inform him of its views. The 
Ombudsman shall then forward a report to the European Parliament and the 
institution, body, office or agency concerned. The person lodging the complaint 
shall be informed of the outcome of such inquiries.
The Implementing Provisions go on to provide a more detailed and 
structured way of handling the matter. They obligate the EO, once he or 
she has found maladministration, to cooperate, as far as possible, with 
the institution or body concerned to find a ‘friendly solution’ to eliminate 
the maladministration and to satisfy the complainant.60 Friendly  solution 
proposals typically identify shortcomings in institutional behaviour, 
which are often remedied in accordance with solutions proposed by the 
 institution itself and may take the form of a sincere apology or some type 
of compensatory action offered to the complainant by the institution.61 In 
59 See, generally, Simone Cadeddu, ‘The proceedings of the European 
Ombudsman’, L & Contemp. Probs. 68 (2004) 161–80.
60 See Article 3(5) Ombudsman Statute and Article 6(1) Implementing 
Provisions.
61 European Ombudsman, ‘Putting it right? How the EU institutions responded 
to the Ombudsman in 2013’ (2014) at www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/fol 
lowup.faces/en/58401/html.bookmark, accessed 4 January 2017, at 5.
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principle, the idea is that the EO facilitates finding such a friendly solution. 
But the fact remains that the measures available to the EO have no legally 
binding effect vis-à-vis the institutions and bodies concerned and do not 
generate subjectively enforceable rights in individuals.62
Where a friendly solution is not possible or the search for such a solu-
tion did not bear fruit,63 or, in current practice, where the EO believes 
that such a solution would not be an effective instrument to achieve a 
systemic change in the public interest, the EO ‘either closes the case with 
a reasoned decision that may include a critical remark or makes a report 
with draft recommendations’64 to the institution concerned as to how the 
maladministration can be eliminated.65 Within three months of receiving 
that  decision or report with recommendations, the institution or body 
must submit its detailed opinion in response thereto66 (e.g., the institu-
tion or body may accept the EO’s recommendations and describe the 
measures it will take (or has taken) to implement them).67 If there is no 
response, or the EO considers the response unsatisfactory, the EO may, 
but is not  obligated to, draw up a special report to the Parliament, which 
may include recommendations; any such report must also be sent to the 
institution concerned and to the complainant.68 The responsibility and 
competence of the EO is, thus, purely recommendatory; he or she has no 
power to order the offending institution or body to take rectifying action 
in the face of a finding of maladministration and his or her decisions do 
not bind any other EU actors (e.g., the Parliament or the CJEU).
Despite this, levels of complaints are steady. According to the EO’s 
annual reports, the majority of complaints received by the EO are brought 
by individual citizens (87 per cent of all complaints in 2014).69 This 
 contrasts with the CJEU, before which the majority of plaintiffs in direct 
62 Order of the CFI in Case T-103/99 Associazione delle cantine sociali 
venete v European Ombudsman and European Parliament (ACSV) [2000] ECR 
II-4165, paras. 47–50; Andreas Hamers, Der Petitionsausschuss des Europäischen 
Parlaments und der Europäische Bürgerbeauftragte – zu den außergerichtlichen 
Beschwerdeeinrichtungen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus 
1999) 174–5.
63 Article 6(3) Implementing Provisions.
64 Article 6(3) Implementing Provisions; see also Article 3(6)–(7) Ombudsman 
Statute.
65 Critical remarks may only be included in accordance with Article 7 
Implementing Provisions.
66 Article 8(2) Implementing Provisions.
67 Article 8(3) Implementing Provisions.
68 Article 8(4) Implementing Provisions.
69 European Ombudsman, Annual Report 2014, 17.
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actions are legal persons. The overall number of new complaints, which 
were higher immediately after Union enlargement in 2004, has  stabilized 
and now remains relatively steady. The first few years after Union 
enlargement in 2004 saw the highest number of complaints.70 Since then 
the number of new complaints has consistently hovered around 2,100.71 
Moreover, consistently year over year, the percentage of admissible new 
complaints has remained at about 33 per cent. In 2014, for example, the 
EO launched 325 complaint-based investigations; the remaining 17 were 
own-initiative investigations. According to the EO, roughly one-third of 
the admissible cases have been settled by what the EO refers to as ‘friendly’ 
solution i.e. without a formal report drafted by the EO.72 Overall, however, 
the numbers of complaint to the EO appear rather low,  considering a 
Union of over 500 million citizens and countless legal persons engaged in 
business therein.
An important difference between the EO’s investigation (followed by a 
finding of maladministration) and judicial review offered by EU courts is 
that the EO has the power to, and regularly does, investigate the relevant 
institution’s or body’s follow-up compliance with her or his recommenda-
tions. The power to do so arises from the power to investigate complaints 
and make recommendations as well as produce reports to the Parliament. 
Part of the complaint handling mandate is to see the solution of the issue 
through to its end. In fact, the EO tracks such compliance on a case-by-
case basis and keeps statistical records thereof.73 Where the EO finds cases 
of maladministration these are in fact regularly closed with some form of 
‘critical’ or ‘further’ remarks by the EO .74 According to a report commis-
sioned by the EO in 2013 on the follow up of the institutions and bodies 
of the Union to EO findings, the rate of what the report calls ‘satisfactory 
follow-up’ by the Union bodies and institutions ‘critical’ and ‘further’ 
remarks was above 80%: ‘The follow up to further remarks was satisfac-
70 There were 3,920 new complaints in 2005 and 3,830 in 2006 (European 
Ombudsman, Annual Report 2006, 40); 3,406 in 2008 (European Ombudsman, 
Annual Report 2008, 37); and 3,098 in 2009 (European Ombudsman, 
Overview Report 2010, 5). In 2010, the number of complaints dropped to 2,667 
(ibid.).
71 European Ombudsman, Annual Report 2014, 17.
72 European Ombudsman, Annual Report 2014, 17.
73 European Ombudsman, ‘Putting it right? How the EU institutions responded 
to the Ombudsman in 2013’ (2014) at www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/fol 
lowup.faces/en/58401/html.bookmark, accessed 4 January 2017, at 5.
74 European Ombudsman, ‘Putting it right? How the EU institutions responded 
to the Ombudsman in 2013’ (2014) at www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/fol 
lowup.faces/en/58401/html.bookmark, accessed 4 January 2017, at 5.
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tory in 83% of cases, whilst the rate of satisfactory follow up of critical 
remarks was 78%.’75
The EO does not always limit his or her recommendations to those 
necessary to rectify the individual case. Rather, when he or she deems 
it appropriate, the EO may include recommendations for procedural 
changes, and even legislative changes, to prevent similar complaints in 
the future. For example, he or she might recommend that the institution 
should provide awareness or other staff training; redesign its internal 
 procedures; or seek legislative changes to allow it to function better.
Distinguishing Ombuds Review from Judicial Review and Other Forms of 
Oversight
The definition of maladministration can result in overlaps between 
ombuds-review, administrative review, and judicial review. Some forms pf 
specific administrative oversight with which potentially the mandate of the 
EO can collide include the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) 
overseeing privacy and data protection by EU institutions and bodies and 
the European Commission anti-fraud office, OLAF, which has a broad, 
general supervisory mandate, which in the context of investigations of 
wrongdoing within the EU’s administration can also cover instances of 
maladministration.76 In fact, if the EO considers that certain facts have 
criminal law implications, he or she is obliged to inform the competent 
national authorities and, if appropriate, the OLAF.77
Overlapping responsibilities can cause duplication, inefficiency, 
 confusion, and even divergent approaches to identical or similar issues. For 
example, the case Commission v Bavarian Lager78 led to a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) between the EDPS and the EO that establishes and 
coordinates their approaches to data protection and access-to-document 
rights.79 Nevertheless, the EU’s independent supervisory bodies,  including 
75 European Ombudsman, ‘Putting it right? How the EU institutions responded 
to the Ombudsman in 2013’ (2014) at www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/fol 
lowup.faces/en/58401/html.bookmark, accessed 4 January 2017, at 7.
76 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 883/2013 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by 
the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 
1073/1999, OJ 2013 L 248/1.
77 Article 4(2) Ombudsman Statute.
78 Case C-28/08 P Commission v Bavarian Lager [2010] ECR I-6055, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:378.
79 European Ombudsman/European Data Protection Supervisor, 
Memorandum of Understanding between the European Ombudsman and the 
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the EO, are typically subject to a statutory prohibition against taking 
instructions from anyone in connection with their duties. Thus, the MoU 
between the EDPS and the EO, in which the latter ‘envisages’ taking the 
views of the EDPS concerning the correct interpretation and application 
of data-protection laws into account, probably reflects the outer boundary 
of self-limitation for the EO and all similarly situated bodies.
Regardless of the existence of agreements like the MoU, pre- existing 
arrangements will generally not be able to provide a complete  solution to 
jurisdictional overlap, especially in situations in which multiple  enquiries 
are simultaneously under way.80 There are, thus, good  arguments for 
having a central registry for recording all complaints currently or 
 previously subject to investigation and all own-initiative investigations 
by all supervisory bodies. This would allow parties as well as institutions 
to be able to discover parallel concerns and coordinate efforts. Therefore, 
any such registry should be made available for inspection by all relevant 
authorities, subject to appropriate safeguards.81
Moreover, some argue that, despite the potentially counter-productive 
lack of consistency in their respective decision, duplicative or overlapping 
enquiries by different independent bodies may not be all bad.82 Ultimately, 
the different enquiries may lead to an overall higher level of protection 
against maladministration and other administrative improprieties and 
to the achievement of the EU’s goal of good administration, as different 
constituencies will be served. The type of complaints received by the EO 
differ from complaints made to other supervisory bodies and the courts. 
Not all matters subject to complaint before the EO are also eligible for 
judicial review before the CJEU.
European Data Protection Supervisor (2007/C 27/07), OJ 2007 C 27/21, illustrates 
the dangers involving the interaction of various supervisory bodies. Commission v 
Bavarian Lager dealt with the Commission’s attempt to balance the right of one 
person to have access to information held by the Commission against the rights of 
other persons to protection of their personal privacy and data.
80 See particularly, Anne Peters, ‘The European Ombudsman and the European 
Constitution’, CMLRev. 42 (2005) 697–743 at 713–14.
81 The mere fact that parallel investigatory procedures are underway before dif-
ferent bodies need not lead to the termination or suspension of any given enquiry. 
It could, however, provide an opportunity for this, but only if that is consistent 
with the statutory obligations of the body concerned. Given that sensitive matters 
and information are likely to be recorded in any such registry, management thereof 
is probably best left to a small inter-authority committee, which is itself subject to 
strict confidentiality obligations.
82 Andreas Hamers, Der Petitionsausschuss des Europäischen Parlaments und der 
Europäische Bürgerbeauftragte – zu den außergerichtlichen Beschwerdeeinrichtungen 
der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus 1999) 268.
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The Ombudsman and the Integrated European Administration
One central problem to ombuds-review in the EU was already on 
the policy making agenda at the time of the creation of the EO: the 
 problems of integrated multilevel administration in the EU. Although 
final  decisions are either adopted by an EU body or by a body under 
national law, Member States authorities are in various cases authorized 
to apply EU law (e.g., in the field of competition law under Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU). In fact, it is rare that the implementation of EU 
policy areas is organised in a way which does not involve some form of 
 composite  decision-making procedures. These are procedures in which 
EU and Member State administrations cooperate in preparation of the 
formal adoption of a final decision either on the national or the European 
level. With regard to allocating powers to address maladministration, this 
distinction of supervisory levels in the face of integrated administrative 
procedures is highly problematic.
As discussed earlier, when the Spanish government made its proposal 
in the drafting of the Treaty of Maastricht it was already acutely aware 
of this set of problems and had, as one of several alternative approaches, 
provided for the possibility of the EO to review action of Member State 
administrations acting in the scope of EU law.83 But the mandate of the 
EO as introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht, now embodied in Article 
228 TFEU, is more narrow: it only refers to the activities of ‘Union 
 institutions, bodies, offices or agencies’.84
EO Söderman, at the very outset of his term, recognized the lacunae 
created by his limited mandate; thus, he called for the organization 
of a network of national and regional ombudsmen (including the 
EO) to provide mutual support and the exchanges of views among its 
members. The resulting network (now known as the European Network 
of Ombudsmen, or just the ‘Network’), improves the overall ability 
to supervise administrative activity concerning EU law throughout 
the Union.85 For example, the Network provides the EO with the 
83 Carlos Moreiro González, ‘The Spanish Proposal to the Intergovernmental 
Conference on Political Union’, in The European Ombudsman (ed.), The European 
Ombudsman, Origins, Establishment, Evolution, Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities (Luxembourg: 2005) 27–37, at p. 34 and Annex II at 
p. 249.
84 As previously mentioned, Article 228 TFEU’s mandate specifically excludes 
the CJEU when acting in its judicial capacity.
85 For a more detailed discussion, see Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, 
‘Promoting Accountability in Multi-Level Governance: A Network Approach’, 
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 opportunity to transfer inadmissible complaints he or she receives to the 
relevant national or regional ombudsmen (and vice versa), so that those 
complaints can be handled by the ombudsman that actually oversees 
the administrative body responsible for the alleged maladministration. 
According to the EO’s office:
The European Network of Ombudsmen consists of over 95 offices in 36 
European countries. The Network includes the national and regional ombuds-
men and similar bodies of the Member States of the European Union, the 
candidate countries for EU membership, and other European Economic 
Area countries, as well as the European Ombudsman and the Committee on 
Petitions of the European Parliament. The national ombudsmen and similar 
bodies in the Network have each appointed a liaison officer to act as a point of 
contact for other members of the Network.86
In addition to transferring cases, Network members seek and offer 
advice, exchange information, and coordinate activities and  investigations. 
Nonetheless, and notwithstanding such cooperation, the strict, organic 
distinction of every ombudsman’s competence can still lead to difficult 
situations, particularly when complaints emerge from what are  commonly 
known as ‘composite administrative procedures’ (i.e., forms of highly 
integrated, administrative-procedural activities in which national and 
EU actors cooperate to implement EU policies).87 The use of such 
composite administrative procedures across a number of policy areas 
underscores the existing gaps or divergences among functionally different 
aspects of administrative organization. Unlike administrative decision-
making network structures, supervisory and accountability mechanisms 
still mostly follow the traditional bifurcated system comprised of separate 
and distinct national and European levels.
The EO’s oversight (i.e., limited to activities by EU-level entities) uses a 
traditionally organized supervisory structure that has difficulty allocating 
responsibility for procedural errors and finding adequate remedies for mal-
administration within such cooperative networks. The structure also has 
difficulty coping with the fact that the typical substantive  cooperation in 
composite administrative procedures is the joint gathering and  subsequent 
sharing of information. Thus, due to the EO’s limited mandate and the 
European Governance Papers No. C-06–02, 19–27 (www.connex-network.org/
eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-06–02.pdf, accessed 19 February 2010).
86 See www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/atyourservice/enointroduction.faces, 
accessed 16 March 2016.
87 Herwig C.H. Hofmann, Gerard C. Rowe and Alexander Türk, Administrative 
Law and Policy of the EU (Oxford University Press 2011) 928–36.
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bifurcated nature of the supervisory system it contemplates, the EO’s can 
only informally rely on the activities of national and regional ombudsmen 
throughout the Member States.
To address these problems, the Network devised a procedure through 
which national and regional ombudsmen can ask the EO to provide written 
answers to queries about European law, its interpretation, and its applica-
tion to special cases. The EO either answers the questions him- or herself 
or, if appropriate, transmits the queries to the appropriate EU institution.88 
This so-called query procedure allows national ombudsmen to obtain 
information and clarification about how the EO understands and interprets 
EU law generally or in relation to particular complaints.89 The latter can be 
important because national ombudsmen from Member States typically 
have a duty to review administrative activity in the implementation of EU 
law, which includes to ensure that substantive and procedural rights arising 
under EU law are fully respected within their national legal systems. The 
speed of the EO’s response will, of course, be of the essence whenever such 
queries are received, which might not be feasible if the EO must frequently 
seek expert input by EU institutions (e.g., the Commission) and agencies.
Another manner to overcome problems arising from the EO’s limited 
mandate is to participate in joint or parallel investigations. An example 
of this approach can be found in the EO’s own-initiative investigation, 
OI/9/2014/MHZ, undertaken in cooperation with her national counter-
parts. The investigation concerned alleged types of maladministration in 
the context of the conduct of ‘joint return operations’ of immigrants to 
countries outside of the EU by the European agency in charge of border 
protection, FRONTEX, together with national authorities.
In her 2016 note entitled ‘Reforming the European Network of 
Ombudsmen’ the EO recently highlighted the benefits of parallel inves-
tigations seeing them as a key tool for advancing ombuds-review in an 
integrated European legal system with exchanges of information about 
pending allegations of maladministration, coordinated  investigations 
into such allegations, and exchanges of investigative results, as well 
as  coordinated procedural steps are indispensable in this context. 
Nonetheless, there appears to still be quite a bit of room for improvement 
in systematizing and formalizing cooperation mechanisms within the 
Network. If this cooperative Network approach were expanded, at least 
88 The European Ombudsman, Annual Report 2006, 129.
89 Nikiforos Diamandouros, ‘The European Ombudsman and the application 
of EU law by the Member States’, Review of European Administrative Law 2 (2008) 
5–37, at 26–7.
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in policy areas with composite administrative procedures, the resulting 
coordinated ombuds-review would become a much more relevant form 
of citizenry protection than recourse to the CJEU. As everyone knows, its 
judicial review only has a one-way reference procedure90 and certainly no 
possibility for coordinated action by the EU and national courts.
The Accountability and Supervision of the European Ombudsman
Supervisory authorities must, themselves, be subject to a certain amount 
of oversight and control to ensure their own accountability; they cannot, 
under the principles of democracy and the rule of law, be accountable to no 
one. Not surprisingly, the EO is primarily accountable to the Parliament, 
who exercises control through parliamentary supervision; ultimately, like 
every other EU institution or body, the EO can be held accountable by 
the CJEU. The CJEU’s General Court has already exercised such judicial 
oversight, ruling on actions for damages brought against the EO pursuant 
to Article 340 TFEU. It has awarded damages for violation of procedural 
standards in cases of manifest error in the performance of the EO’s duties 
when such error had a causal link to harm suffered by an individual that 
was subject to review under the criteria of Article 340, second paragraph 
TFEU (Article 288, second paragraph EC) in respect of an action for 
damages.91 The type of unlawful acts that the Court has reviewed includes 
matters such as distortion of facts, failure to exercise diligence in duties of 
inquiry, and a violation of the obligation to act within reasonable time.92 It 
is fitting that a body in charge of reviewing those same criteria in connec-
tion with others has been held to the exact same standards in the exercise 
of its functions. In that case, the Court ordered the EO to pay non-
pecuniary damages for its violation of those principles.93 Additionally, 
although initially pre-Lisbon, an action for failure to act was dismissed 
by that Court because it found that the EO was not an institution,94 under 
90 Article 267 TFEU.
91 Case C-234/02 P European Ombudsman v Lamberts [2004] ECR I-2803, 
paras. 31–70; Case T-209/00 Lamberts v European Ombudsman [2002] ECR 
II-2203, paras. 45–60. For further reading, see Peter Gjerloeff Bonnor, ‘The 
European Ombudsman: a novel source of soft law in the European Union’, 
ELRev. 25 (2000) 39–56.
92 T-217/11 Claire Staelen v European Ombudsman of 29 April 2015, para. 336.
93 T-217/11 Claire Staelen v European Ombudsman of 29 April 2015, para. 336 
establishing the damages ex aequo et bono.
94 On the basis of former Article 232 EC; see, e.g., Case T-103/99 Associazione 
delle cantine sociali venete v European Ombudsman and European Parliament 
(ACSV) [2000] ECR II-4165.
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Article 265 TFEU the review now extends to omissions to all ‘bodies, 
offices and agencies of the Union’ including the EO. Actions against the 
EO for annulment under Article 263 TFEU or failure to act under Article 
265 TFEU are, subject to the limitations otherwise stated in the TFEU, 
admissible.95 The Court might also be called on to rule on the limits of 
ombuds-review and, thus, have an opportunity to provide its definitive, 
judicial interpretation of the concept of maladministration.
ASSESSMENT: THE OMBUDSMAN AS 
‘INTEGRITY’-BODY
This chapter outlined the constitutional mandate and legal framework 
of the EO with a view towards assessing future possibilities of ombuds-
review within the EU. The EO is an alternative to judicial review ensuring 
that EU citizens and others residing in the Union can enjoy, to the fullest, 
their rights arising from the Treaties and Union law whilst being served 
by, as Article 298 TFEU now expresses, an ‘open, efficient and independ-
ent European administration’.96 By contrast to judicial review, ombuds-
review commands no binding authority. Rather, the EO must rely on 
his or her powers of persuasion, in the form of publicized investigations 
of, and critical remarks or recommendations directed at, recalcitrant EU 
institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies, which are intended to ‘name and 
shame’ them because such critical remarks and recommendations are, to 
the extent permitted by law, made public. Also, to undertake his or her 
investigatory functions, the EO must often depend, at least to some extent, 
on the cooperation of the very Union institutions or bodies it is investigat-
ing. If the institution or body refuses to address any maladministration the 
EO finds, the EO must depend on the Parliament to take heed of his or her 
reports and actually follow up on unremediated maladministration.
The EO expands possible avenues of individual redress and stimulates 
systematic redress of administrative (mal)practice, but does so from a 
position of relative weakness. Independence and impartiality can thus be 
counted as amongst the EO’s most powerful attributes. Arguably, it is the 
EO’s ultimate lack of hard power – from a legal, rather than a moral or 
political point of view – that supplies his or her capacity to achieve positive 
results in a relatively simple and efficient way, even though the EO can 
never guarantee success. Maintaining what can be broadly referred to as 
95 See, e.g., C-535/12 P Olatra v European Ombudsman of 6 June 2013.
96 Article 298 TFEU.
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systemic ‘integrity’, as opposed to a purely legal review, is characteristic of 
bodies that are neither directly linked to any of the three ‘classic’ branches 
of powers such as the EO. The EO’s contribution to maintaining the 
‘integrity’ of decision-making through their persuasive powers and their 
ability to raise public exposure and awareness through their reports and 
decisions. It is in these contexts that the EO occupies a unique position.
By handling individual complaints and basing proposals on real life 
cases, the the EO gains legitimacy, public standing and respect from the 
EU’s institutions. The EO’s mediation role in resolving complaint based 
cases in which the wrong becomes evident in an individual situation, leads 
increased compliance by EU institutions with the suggestions made by 
the EO. A high rate of compliance, if visibly achieved, can give credibility 
to the EO way of solving problems even in the absence of legally binding 
solutions and potential payments of damages. The decisive weakness of 
the complaint-based system of initiating ombuds-review, however, is that 
it is dependent on a high level of awareness among the European citizenry. 
Only if the citizens which can be affected of maladministration know of 
the existence, accessibility, and potential power of the EO as an institu-
tion, will they enter complaints. In that regard, more effort might be made 
by all EU institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies to promote the role of 
the EO. It might be unrealistic to expect the EU administration to embrace 
that task with great enthusiasm.
This is where the use of own-initiative investigations by the EO might 
have a place to raise awareness of the EO. They do however most good 
in cases where the individuals most affected by maladministration have 
no realistic chance of lodging a complaint, such as occurred in the case of 
refugees facing joint return operation administered by FRONTEX.97 The 
EO’s own-initiative investigations can also be a very helpful tool when 
the number of individual complaints indicates the existence of systemic 
problems in a certain field.
However, a systematic use of own-initiative investigations into fields 
the EO identifies as problematic (based on his or her own convictions 
rather than the volume of individual complaints) would require further 
scrutiny as to whether the advantages of such an approach outweigh the 
potential disadvantages. Potential constraints have to be weighed when 
devising techniques that would allow the EO to reach the highly ambitious 
goal of ensuring integrity and accountability within the Union’s executive 
branch. Here, the EO would face a significant risk of being accused of 
97 See the Ombudsman’s own-initiative inquiry OI/9/2014/MHZ regarding 
types of maladministration in the context of FRONTEX.
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being  politically motivated and acting indiscriminately, based on his or her 
own political agenda. The EO might even run the risk of being pulled into 
existing inter-institutional conflicts, which would be highly detrimental to 
his or her independence (or just the perception of his or her independence) 
and, thus, his or her impartiality. The risks of engaging in investigations 
that could result in a loss of status as an independent mediator between 
citizens and the EU administration must, therefore, be very carefully 
evaluated.
The big question, then, is whether taking on a decidedly political role 
limits, in effect, the EO’s ability to conduct impartial enquiries, which 
is the basis of the EO’s independence. Does taking on a more political 
role  actually endanger the EO or risk accusations that the EO is just 
another policy ‘entrepreneur’? If one accepts that the basis for the respect 
and legitimacy offered to the EO is his or her impartial mediating role 
and problem-solving capacity, the risks of undertaking a more political 
role are quite real. If, on the other hand, the EO’s central problem is 
the  public’s lack of awareness of the existence of the EO, then headline-
grabbing, politically sensitive investigations, which no other actors are 
able to undertake, may be an important tool in the EO’s repertoire.98
98 See, e.g., European Ombudsman, Case OI/6/2016/AB opened on 26 May 
2016.
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